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Abstract
We consider a group of m + 1 trusted nodes that aim to create a shared secret key K over a network in the
presence of a passive eavesdropper, Eve. We assume a linear non-coherent network coding broadcast channel (over a
finite field Fq) from one of the honest nodes (i.e., Alice) to the rest of them including Eve. All of the trusted nodes
can also discuss over a cost-free public channel which is also overheard by Eve.
For this setup, we propose upper and lower bounds for the secret key generation capacity assuming that the field
size q is very large. For the case of two trusted terminals (m = 1) our upper and lower bounds match and we have
complete characterization for the secrecy capacity in the large field size regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
For communication over a network performing linear network coding, Cai and Yeung [1] introduced the problem
of securing a multicast transmission against an eavesdropper. In particular, consider a network implementing linear
network coding over a finite field Fq. Let us assume that the min-cut value from the source to each receiver is c.
From the main theorem of network coding [2], [3] we know that a source can send information at rate equal to
the min-cut c to the destinations, in the absence of any malicious eavesdropper. Now, suppose there is a passive
eavesdropper, Eve, who overhears ρ arbitrary edges in the network. The secure network coding problem is to design
a coding scheme such that Eve does not obtain any information about the messages transmitted from the source
to destinations. Cai and Yeung [1] showed that the secrecy capacity for this problem is c− ρ and can be achieved
if the field size q is sufficiently large. Later this problem formulation has been investigated in many other works.
Feldman et al. [4] showed that by sacrificing a small amount of rate, one might find a secure scheme that requires
much smaller field size. Rouayheb et al. [5] observed that this problem can be considered as a generalization of the
Ozarow-Wyner wiretap channel of type II. Silva et al. [6] proposed a universal coding scheme that only employs
encoding at the source.
In contrast to the previous work, in this paper we study the problem of secret key sharing among multiple
terminals when nodes can send feedback over a public channel. We consider a source multicasting information over
a network at rate equal to the min-cut c to the destinations. We also assume that the relay nodes in the network
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2perform linear randomized network coding which is modeled by a non-coherent transmission scheme. Motivated
by [7], [8], we model a non-coherent network coding scenario by a multiplicative matrix channel over a finite field
Fq with uniform and i.i.d. distribution over transfer matrices in every time-slot.
The problem of key agreement between a set of terminals with access to noisy broadcast channel and public
discussion channel (visible to the eavesdropper) was studied in [9], where some achievable secrecy rates were
established, assuming Eve does not have access to the noisy broadcast transmissions. This was generalized in [10],
[11] by developing (non-computable) outer bounds for secrecy rates. However, to the best of our knowledge, ours
is the first work to consider multi-terminal secret key agreement over networks employing randomized network
coding, when a passive eavesdropper has access to the broadcast transmissions.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows. For the secret key sharing problem introduced above, we propose
an asymptotic achievability scheme assuming that the field size q is large. This scheme is based on subspace coding
and can be extended for arbitrary number of terminals. Using the result of [9], we derive an upper bound for this
problem. For m = 1, the proposed lower bound matches the upper bound and the secret key generation capacity is
characterized. However, for m ≥ 2, depending on the channel parameters, the upper and lower bound might match
or not.
The paper is organized as follows. In §II we introduce our notation and the problem formulation and present
some preliminaries. In §III, we state a general upper bound for the key generation capacity and evaluate it for the
non-coherent network coding broadcast channel. The main results of the paper are presented in §IV.
II. NOTATION AND SETUP
A. Notation
All vectors are column vectors unless otherwise stated. Fixed matrices are denoted by bold uppercase letters
and normal uppercase letters denote the random matrices. We use 〈A〉 to denote the row span of a matrix A. For
convenience, we also use [i : j] to denote {i, i+ 1, . . . , j} where i, j ∈ Z.
Let Π be an arbitrary vector space of finite dimension defined over a finite field Fq. Suppose Π1 and Π2 are
two subspaces of Π, i.e., Π1 v Π and Π2 v Π. We use Π1 ∩ Π2 to denote the common subspaces of both Π1
and Π2 and Π1 +Π2 as the smallest subspace that contains both Π1 and Π2. Two subspaces Π1 and Π2 are called
orthogonal if Π1 ∩ Π2 = {0}. Two subspaces Π1 and Π2 of Π are called complementary if they are orthogonal
and Π1 +Π2 = Π.
Now, consider two subspaces Π1 and Π2. We define the subtraction of Π2 from Π1 by U = Π1 \s Π2 where
U is any subspace of Π1 which is complementary with Π1 ∩ Π2. Note that, given Π1 and Π2, U is not uniquely
defined.
For notational convenience, when J is a set, by ΠJ we mean ΠJ , ∩i∈JΠi.
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3B. Preliminaries
Definition 1 (Grassmannian and Gaussian coefficient [12], [13]). The Grassmannian Gr(`, d)q is the set of all
d-dimensional subspaces of the `-dimensional space over a finite field Fq , namely,
Gr(`, d)q , {pi v F
`
q : dim(pi) = d}. (1)
The cardinality of Gr(`, d)q is the Gaussian coefficient, namely,[
`
d
]
q
, |Gr(`, d)q| =
d−1∏
i=0
q`−i − 1
qd−i − 1
. (2)
Definition 2. We define S(`,m)q to be the set (sphere) of all subspaces of dimension at most m in the `-dimensional
space F`q, namely
S(`,m)q ,
min[m,`]⋃
d=0
Gr(`, d)q = {pi v F
`
q : dim(pi) ≤ min[m, `]}. (3)
Definition 3 (see [7]). We denote by ξ(n, d) the number of different n × ` matrices with elements from a finite
field Fq , such that their rows span a specific subspace pid v F`q of dimension d where 0 ≤ d ≤ min[n, `]. Note that
ξ(n, d) does not depend on ` and depends on pid only through its dimension d [7, Lemma 2].
For simplicity, in the rest of the paper, we will drop the subscript q in the previous definitions whenever it is
obvious from the context.
Lemma 1. Suppose that k subspaces Π1, . . . ,Πk, with dimensions d1, . . . , dk, are chosen uniformly at random
from Fnq . Then with high probability (probability of order 1−O(q−1)) we have
dim (Π1 + · · ·+Πk) = min [d1 + · · ·+ dk, n] , (4)
and
dim (Π1 ∩ · · · ∩ Πk) = [d1 + · · ·+ dk − (k − 1)n]
+
. (5)
Note that if one of the subspaces, for example Π1, be a fixed subspace then the above results still hold.
Proof: These results follow from [14, Corollary 1] by using induction on the number of subspaces.
C. Problem Statement
We consider a set of m + 1 ≥ 2 honest nodes, T0, . . . ,Tm, (T stands for “terminal”) that aim to share a
secret key K among themselves while keeping it concealed from a passive adversary, Eve. Eve does not perform
any transmissions, but is trying to eavesdrop on (overhear) the communications between the honest nodes. For
convenience, sometimes we will refer to node T0,T1,T2, . . . , as “Alice,” “Bob,” “Calvin,” and so on.
We assume that there exists a non-coherent network coding broadcast channel (which is going to be defined more
pricesely in the followig) from Alice to the other terminals (including Eve). Also we assume that the legitimate
terminals can publicly discuss over a noiseless rate unlimited public channel.
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4Consider a non-coherent linear network coding communication scenario where at every time-slot t Alice injects
a set of nA vectors (packets) of length ` (over some finite field Fq) into the network, denoted by the row vectors of
the matrix XA[t] ∈ FnA×`q . Each terminal Ti receives ni randomly chosen linear combinations of the transmitted
vectors, namely for r ∈ {T1, . . . ,Tm,E}, we have1
Xr[t] = Fr [t]XA[t], (6)
where Fr [t] ∈ Fnr×nAq is chosen uniformly at random among all possible matrices and independently for each
receiver and every time-slot. So for the channel transition probability we can write
PX1···XmXE|XA(x1, . . . , xm, xE|xA) = PXE|XA(xE|xA)
m∏
i=1
PXi|XA(xi|xA), (7)
where for each r ∈ {T1, . . . ,Tm,E} we have [7, Sec IV-A]
PXr |XA(xr|xA) ,


q−ndim(xA) if 〈xr〉 v 〈xA〉 ,
0 otherwise.
(8)
Note that in this setup we do not assume any CSI2 at the transmitter or receivers.
III. UPPER BOUND
A. Secrecy Upper Bound for Independent Broadcast Channels
The secret key generation capacity among multiple terminals (without eavesdropper having access to the broadcast
channel) is completely characterized in [9]. By using this result, it is possible to state an upper bound for the
secrecy capacity of the key generation problem among multiple terminals where the eavesdropper has also access
to the broadcast channel. This can be done by adding a dummy terminal to the first problem and giving all the
eavesdropper’s information to this dummy node and let it to participate in the key generation protocol. By doing
so, the secret key generation rate does not decrease. Hence by combining [9, Theorem 4.1] and [9, Lemma 5.1],
the following result can be stated.
Theorem 1. The secret key generation capacity is upper bounded as follows
Cs ≤ max
PX0
min
λ∈Λ([0:m])

H(X[0:m]|XE)− ∑
B([0:m]
λBH(XB|XBc , XE)

 , (9)
where Λ([0 : m]) is the set of all collections λ = {λB : B ( [0 : m], B 6= ∅} of weights 0 ≤ λB ≤ 1, satisfying∑
B([0:m],i∈B
λB = 1, ∀i ∈ [0 : m]. (10)
1During the paper, we use Ti and i interchangeably when they are used as subscript. So instead of XTi we sometimes write Xi . At some
points, we also use XA, XB, XC, etc., to denote for X0, X1, X2, etc.
2Channel state information.
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5Note that in the above expression for the upper bound, it is possible to change the order of maximization and
minimization [9, Theorem 4.1].
Now, for our problem where the channel from Alice to the other terminals are assumed to be independent, we
can further simplify the upper bound given in Theorem 1, as stated in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. If the channels from Alice to the other terminals are independent, as described in (7), then the upper
bound stated in Theorem 1, for the secret key generation capacity is simplified to
Cs ≤ max
PX0
min
j∈[1:m]
I(X0;Xj |XE) (11)
≤ min
j∈[1:m]
max
PX0
I(X0;Xj |XE). (12)
Proof: For the proof please refer to Appendix B.
Remark: Note that (11) is the best upper bound one might hope for an independent broadcast channel using the
results of [9].
Remark: Using [15, Theorem 7] or [16, Theorem 2], we observe that the bound given in (12) is indeed tight for the
two terminals problem where we have the Markov chains XB ↔ XA ↔ XE (when the channels are independent)
or XA ↔ XB ↔ XE (when the channels are degraded).
B. Upper Bound for Non-coherent Channel
In the previous section, we have shown that the secret key generation rate for our problem can be upper bounded
by (12). Now, we need to evaluate the above upper bound for the non-coherent network coding channel defined in
§II-C.
Lemma 2. For the joint distribution of the form
PXAXiXE(xA, xi, xE) = PXA(xA)PXi|XA(xi|xA)PXE|XA(xE|xA) (13)
the mutual information I(XA;Xi|XE) is a concave function of PXA(xA) for fixed PXi|XA(xi|xA) and PXE|XA(xE|xA).
Proof: TBA.
Similar to [7, Definition 5], here we define an equivalent subspace broadcast channel from Alice to the rest of
terminals as follows. We assume that Alice sends a subspace ΠA ∈ S(`, nA) where ΠA = 〈XA〉 and each of the
legitimate terminals receives Πi ∈ S(`, ni) and Eve receives ΠE ∈ S(`, nE) where Πi = 〈Xi〉 and ΠE = 〈XE〉,
respectively. The channel transition probabilities are independent and for each receiver i is defined as follows
PΠi|ΠA(pii|piA) ,


ξ(ni, dim(pii))q
−ni dim(piA) if pii v piA,
0 otherwise,
(14)
where the function ξ is defined in §II-B.
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6Lemma 3. For every input distribution PXA there exists an input distribution PΠA such that I(XA;Xi|XE) =
I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) and vice-versa.
Proof: We can expand I(XA;Xi|XE) = I(XA;XiXE) − I(XA;XE). Using [7, Theorem 1], by defining
ΠA = 〈XA〉 and Πr = 〈Xr〉 for r ∈ {T1, . . . ,Tm,TE}, we can write
I(XA;Xi|XE) = I(XA;XiXE)− I(XA;XE)
= I(ΠA; Πi +ΠE)− I(ΠA; ΠE)
(a)
≤ I(ΠA; Πi,ΠE)− I(ΠA; ΠE)
= I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) (15)
where (a) is true because of the data processing inequality applied on the Marcov chain Πi+ΠE ↔ (Πi,ΠE) ↔ ΠA.
On the other hand, again by applying data processing inequality, we can write
I(XA;Xi|XE) = I(XA;XiXE)− I(XA;XE)
(a)≥ I(ΠA; Πi,ΠE)− I(XA;XE)
(b)
= I(ΠA; Πi,ΠE)− I(ΠA; ΠE)
= I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) (16)
where (a) is true because of the Marcov chain (Πi,ΠE) ↔ (Xi, XE) ↔ XA ↔ ΠA and (b) is true because of [7,
Theorem 1]. Hence we are done.
So by Lemma 3, in order to maximize I(XA;Xi|XE) with respect to PXA it is sufficient to solve an equivalent
problem, i.e., maximize I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) with respect to PΠA ; which is seemingly a simpler optimization problem
than the original one.
Lemma 4. The input distribution that maximizes I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) is the one which is uniform over all subspaces
having the same dimension.
Proof: By the concavity of I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) with respect to PΠA , that is stated in Lemma 2, the proof follows
by an argument very similar to [7, Lemma 8].
Lemma 5. Asymptotically in the field size we have
max
PX
A
I(XA;Xi|XE) = max
PΠ
A
I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE)
= (min[nA, ni + nE]− nE) (`−min[nA, ni + nE]) log q. (17)
Proof: For the proof refer to Appendix B.
Thus, by using the upper bound given in (12) and Lemma 5 we have the following result for the upper bound
on the secret key generation rate, as stated in Theorem 2.
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7Theorem 2. The secret key generation rate in a non-coherent network coding scenario, which is defined in §II-C,
is upper bounded by
Cs ≤ min
i∈[1:m]
[(min[nA, ni + nE]− nE) (`−min[nA, ni + nE])] log q. (18)
Remark: Note that if nE = nA then the secret key generation rate is zero because Eve is so powerful that she
overhears all of the transmitted information.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME FOR ARBITRARY NUMBER OF TERMINALS
Here in this section, we describe our achievability scheme for the secret key sharing problem among multiple
terminals in a non-coherent network coding setup.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that3 nA < `. Moreover, in this work we focus an the asymptotic regime
where the field size is large. Suppose that Alice broadcasts a message XA[t] at time-slot t of the following form
XA[t] =
[
InA×nA M [t]
]
, (19)
where M [t] ∈ FnA×(`−nA)q is a uniformly at random distributed matrix. The rest of legitimate terminals and Eve
receive a linear transformed version of XA[t] according to the channel introduced in (6).
For each terminal r ∈ {T0, . . . ,Tm,TE}, we define the subspace Πr , 〈Xr〉. Then, for every r 6= T0 we have
Πr v ΠA. Because of (19), after broadcasting XA[t], the legitimate terminals learn the channel state and reveal
the channel transfer matrices Fr[t], r ∈ [1 : m], publicly over the public channel. Thus Alice can also recover the
subspaces Πr for all of the legitimate terminals.
Now, for each non-empty subset J ⊆ [1 : m] of legitimate receivers, let us define the subspace UJ as follows
UJ , ΠJ \s
(∑
i∈J c
ΠiJ +ΠEJ
)
, (20)
where ΠJ = ∩i∈JΠi, ΠiJ = Πi ∩ΠJ , and ΠEJ = ΠE ∩ΠJ . By definition, UJ is the common subspace among
the receivers in J which is orthogonal to all of the subspaces of other terminals, i.e., it is orthogonal to Πi, i ∈ J c,
and ΠE (see also Fig. 1). Note that the subspaces UJ ’s are not uniquely defined. However, from the definition of
the operator “\s”, it can be easily shown that the dimension of each UJ is uniquely determined and equal to
dim(UJ ) = dim(ΠJ )− dim
(∑
i∈J c
ΠiJ +ΠEJ
)
. (21)
If Alice had the subspace ΠE observed by Eve, she would be able to construct subspaces UJ ’s; but she does not
have ΠE. However, because the subspaces Πi’s and ΠE are chosen independently and uniformly at random from
ΠA, and because the field size q is large, Alice, by applying Lemma 1, can find the dimension of each UJ w.h.p.
Then it can be easily observed that (e.g., see [14, Lemma 3]) if Alice chooses a uniformly at random subspace of
ΠJ with dimension dim(UJ ) then it satisfies (20) w.h.p., so it can be a possible candidate for UJ .
3If ` ≤ nA then Alice can reduce the number of injected packets into the network from nA to some smaller number n′A where n′A < `.
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8Now, consider 2m − 1 different non-empty subsets of [1 : m]. To each subset ∅ 6= J ⊆ [1 : m], we assign a
parameter θJ ≥ 0 such that the following set of inequalities hold,
θJ1 + · · ·+ θJk ≤ dim (UJ1 + · · ·+ UJk +ΠE)− dim(ΠE), (22)
for any k ∈ [1 : 2(2m−1) − 1] and any different selection of subsets J1, . . . ,Jk. Note that the right hand side of
the inequalities defined in (22) depend on the actual choice of subspaces UJ ’s. But, as described above, in the
following we assume that UJ ’s are chosen uniformly at random from ΠJ .
If Alice knows the subspace ΠE, then we can state the following result.
Lemma 6. There exists subspaces U ′J v UJ such that dim(U ′J ) = θJ for all ∅ 6= J ⊆ [1 : m], and U ′J ’s and
ΠE are orthogonal subspaces (i.e., dim(ΠE +
∑
i U
′
Ji
) = dim(ΠE) +
∑
i θJi ) if and only if θJ ’s are non-negative
integers and satisfy (22).
Proof: The proof of this lemma is based on [17, Lemma 4] and can be found in Appendix B.
Fig.1 depicts pictorially the relation between subspaces introduced in the above discussions.
Fig. 1. The relations between subspaces Π’s, U ’s, and U ′’s for the case of m = 2.
Although in practice Alice only knows the dimension of ΠE (w.h.p.), but still she can find subspsces U ′J v UJ
such that the result of Lemma 6 holds w.h.p., as stated in Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. Alice can find subspaces U ′J v UJ such that dim(U ′J ) = θJ for all ∅ 6= J ⊆ [1 : m], and U ′J ’s
are orthogonal subspaces and U ′J ’s and ΠE are orthogonal subspaces w.h.p., if and only if θJ ’s are non-negative
integers and satisfy (22).
Proof: For the proof refer to Appendix B.
Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 3. The secret key sharing rate given by the solution of the following convex optimization problem can
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9be achieved
maximize
[
minr∈[1:m]
∑
J3r θJ
]
(`− nA) log q
subject to θJ ≥ 0, ∀J ⊆ [1 : m], J 6= ∅, and
θJ1 + · · ·+ θJk ≤
dim (UJ1 + · · ·+ UJk +ΠE)− dim(ΠE)
∀k, ∀J1, . . . ,Jk : ∅ 6= Ji ⊆ [1 : m],
Ji 6= Jj if i 6= j,
(23)
where for every J , UJ is chosen uniformly at random from ΠJ with the dimension calculated by (21) under the
assumption that Π1, . . . ,Πm, and ΠE are selected independently and uniformly at random from ΠA with dimensions
n1, . . . , nm, and nE respectively.
Proof: Let Alice use the broadcast channel N times by sending matrices XA[1], . . . , XA[N ] of the form (19).
As mentioned before, in every time-slot t, each of the legitimate terminals sends publicly the channel transfer matrix
it has received.
Then, let us define θˆJ , bNθJ c for all J and consider the following set of inequalities
θˆJ1 + · · ·+ θˆJk +N dim(ΠE) ≤
dim
(
N⊕
t=1
UJ1 [t] + · · ·+
N⊕
t=1
UJk [t] +
N⊕
t=1
ΠE[t]
)
, (24)
where “⊕” is the direct sum operator. Each of UˆJi ,
⊕N
t=1 UJi [t] is a subspace of an N × nA dimensional space⊕N
t=1ΠA[t]. Similarly, we have ΠˆE v
⊕N
t=1ΠA[t] where ΠˆE ,
⊕N
t=1ΠE[t]. It can be easily seen that if the set
of inequalities (22) are satisfied then the set of inequalities (24) are also satisfied.
Now, by using Lemma 7, Alice can find a set of orthogonal subspaces Uˆ ′J with dimension θˆJ (that are also
orthogonal to ΠˆE w.h.p.). By applying Lemma 8, one would observe that if Alice uses a basis of Uˆ ′J (θˆJ linear
independent vectors from Uˆ ′J ) to share a secret key KJ with all terminals in J , then this key is secure from Eve
and all other legitimate terminals in J c w.h.p.Using each key KJ , Alice can send a message of size θˆJ (`−nA) log q
secretly to the terminals in J . In order to share the key KJ , Alice sends publicly a set of coefficients for each
terminal in J so that each of them can construct the subspace UˆJ from their own received subspace. Note that
even having these coefficients, Eve cannot recover any information regarding KJ (for more discussion see [18]).
Up untill now, the problem of sharing a key K among legitimate terminals have been reduced to a multicast
problem where Alice would like to transmit a message (i.e., the shared key K) to a set of terminal where the rth
one has a min-cut
∑
J3r θˆJ . From the main theorem of network coding (e.g., see [2], [3], [19], [20]), we know
that this problem can be solved by performing linear network coding where the achievable rate is as follows
Rs ≤
[
1
N
min
r∈[1:m]
∑
J3r
θˆJ
]
(`− nA) log q. (25)
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By increasing N , the achievable secrecy rate will be arbitrarily close to
Rs ≤
[
min
r∈[1:m]
∑
J3r
θJ
]
(` − nA) log q, (26)
and we are done.
Lemma 8. Consider a set of nA packets denoted by the rows of a matrix XA ∈ FnA×`q of the form XA = [I M ],
where M ∼ Uni
(
F
nA×(`−nA)
q
)
. Assume that Eve has overheard nE independent linear combinations of these
packets, represented by the rows of a matrix XE ∈ FnE×`q . Then for every k packets y1, . . . , yk that are linear
combinations of the rows of XA, if the subspace ΠY = 〈y1, . . . , yk〉 is orthogonal to 〈XE〉 we have
I(y1, . . . , yk;XE) = 0. (27)
Proof: The proof is stated in Appendix B.
A. Special Case: Achievability Scheme for Two Terminals
For simplicity and without loss of generality we assume that nB ≤ nA and nE ≤ nA. The key generation scheme
starts by Alice broadcasting a message XA[t] at time t of the form of (19). Then, Theorem 3 states that the secrecy
rate Rs is achievable if
Rs ≤ [dim(UB +ΠE)− dim(ΠE)] (`− nA) log q, (28)
where UB = ΠB \s ΠE (for convenience we have replaced U{B} with UB). Because UB ∩ ΠE = {0}, we have
Rs ≤ [dim(UB)] (` − nA) log q
= [dim(ΠB)− dim(ΠB ∩ ΠE)] (`− nA) log q
=
[
nB − (nB + nE − nA)
+
]
(`− nA) log q
= [min[nA, nB + nE]− nE] (`− nA) log q, bits/matrix channel use, (29)
where this is the same as the upper bound given in Theorem 2. This is obvious when nA ≤ nB + nE. On the other
hand, if nA > nB + nE, we can reduce the number of injected packets by Alice in every time-slot from nA to
nB + nE (there is no need to use more than nB + nE degrees of freedom).
Remark: Note that in the above scheme, as long as nE < nA, the secrecy rate is non-zero.
Now, we compare the derived secrecy rate with the case where no feedback is allowed. First let us assume that
nB ≥ nE. Then, in the non-coherent network coding scenario introduced in §II-C, it can be easily verified that
the channel from Alice to Eve is a stochastically degraded (for the definition refer to [21, p. 373]) version of the
channel from Alice to Bob.
So by applying the result of [22] or [23, Theorem 3], for the secret key sharing capacity we can write
Cs = max
PX
A
[I(XA;XB)− I(XA;XE)]
= max
PΠ
A
[I(ΠA; ΠB)− I(ΠA; ΠE)] , (30)
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where the sufficiency of optimization over subspaces follows from [7, Theorem 1]. Similar to the proof of Lemma 5
(because in the proof of Lemma 5, we also maximize an expression that contains subtraction of two mutual
information similar to (30)), one can show that
Cs = [nB − nE](`− nB) log q, (31)
which is positive only if nB > nE (obviously for the case nB < nE we have Cs = 0 as well, because even for a
weaker eavesdropper, when nB = nE, we have Cs = 0). 
The above comparison demonstrates the amount of improvement of the secret key generation rate we might gain
by using feedback.
B. Special Case: Achievability Scheme for Three Terminals
As an another example, here we consider the three trusted terminals problem (i.e., m = 2). As before, we assume
that nA < ` and for the convenience we suppose that nB = nC ≤ nA and nE ≤ nA.
In order to characterize the achievable secrecy rate, we need to find the dimension of subspaces UB, UC, and
UBC and their sums (including ΠE as well). We assume that the field size q is large. We know that ΠB, ΠC, and
ΠE are chosen uniformly at random from nA-dimensional space ΠA. Subspaces ΠBC and ΠBE are also distributed
independently and uniformly at ranodm in ΠB. Similarly, the same is true for ΠBC and ΠCE in ΠC.
We have 

UB = ΠB \s (ΠBC +ΠBE)
UC = ΠC \s (ΠBC + ΠCE)
UBC = ΠBC \s (ΠBCE),
(32)
so we can write
dim(UB) = dim(ΠB)− dim(ΠBC +ΠBE)
(a)
= dim(ΠB)−min [dim(ΠBC) + dim(ΠBE), dim(ΠB)]
(b)
= nB −min [dim(ΠBC) + dim(ΠBE), nB]
= [nB − dim(ΠBC)− dim(ΠBE)]
+
(c)
=
[
nB − (2nB − nA)
+ − (nB + nE − nA)
+
]+
, (33)
where (a) follows from Lemma 1 because ΠBC and ΠBE are chosen independently and uniformly at random from
ΠB, (b) is true because q is large, and (c) follows from Lemma 1. Note that because we have assumed nB = nC it
follows that dim(UC) = dim(UB).
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Similarly, for the dimension of UBC we can write
dim(UBC) = dim(ΠBC)− dim(ΠBCE)
= dim(ΠBC)− [dim(ΠBC) + nE − nA]
+
= min[nA − nE, dim(ΠBC)]
= min
[
nA − nE, (2nB − nA)
+
]
. (34)
Proposition 1. From the construction, the subspaces UB, UC, and UBC are complementary. The same holds for UB,
UBC, and ΠE and similarly for UC, UBC, and ΠE w.h.p.
Now we may write the linear program stated in Theorem 3 as follows
maximize min [θB + θBC, θC + θBC] (`− nA) log q
subject to θB ≤ dim(UB +ΠE)− nE
θC ≤ dim(UC +ΠE)− nE
θBC ≤ dim(UBC +ΠE)− nE
θB + θC ≤ dim(UB + UC +ΠE)− nE
θB + θC + θBC ≤ dim(UB + UC + UBC +ΠE)− nE.
(35)
Because of the symmetry in the problem (nB = nC), for the optimal solution we should have θB = θC. Knowing
this and using Proposition 1, we may furthur simplify the above linear program as follows
maximize [θB + θBC] (`− nA) log q
subject to θB ≤
1
2 [dim(UB + UC +ΠE)− nE] , α1
θBC ≤ dim(UBC) , α2
2θB + θBC ≤ dim(UB + UC + UBC +ΠE)− nE , α3.
(36)
From the definitions of α’s, we can easily observe that, α3 ≥ 2α1, α3 ≥ α2, and α3 ≤ 2α1 +α2. Hence, θB + θBC
gets its maximum at the point (θB, θBC) = (α3−α22 , α2). Thus, for the maximum acheivable secrecy rate we have
Rs =
[
α2 + α3
2
]
(` − nA) log q. (37)
As mentioned before, we assume that subspaces UJ ’s are chosen uniformly at random from ΠJ . So ΠE and
UJ ’s are independent and for α3 we can write
α3 = min[dim(UB) + dim(UC) + dim(UBC) + dim(ΠE), nA]− nE
= min[dim(UB) + dim(UC) + dim(UBC), nA − nE]
= min[2 dim(UB) + dim(UBC), nA − nE]. (38)
Finally, for the secrecy rate (acheivable asymptotically whene q goes to infinity) we have
Rs = min
[
dim(UB) + dim(UBC),
1
2
(nA + dim(UBC)− nE)
]
(`− nA) log q. (39)
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Example 1. As an example, here we compare the achievable secret key sharing rate among three legitimate terminals
(i.e., m = 2) as derived in (39) with the upper bound stated in Theorem 2. We consider two symmetric setup where
for the first one we have nA = 60, nB = nC = 15 (see Fig. 2(a)) and for the second one we have nA = 60,
nB = nC = 45 (see Fig. 2(b)). In each of these situations, we depict the upper and lower bounds on the secret key
generation rate as a function of the number of packets (degrees of freedom) received by Eve, i.e., nE.
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(a) m = 2, nA = 60, and nB = nC = 15.
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(b) m = 2, nA = 60, and nB = nC = 45.
Fig. 2. A comparison between the achievable secrecy rate of Theorem 3 and the upper bound given by Theorem 2 for two cases: (a) when
m = 2, nA = 60, and nB = nC = 15 and (b) when m = 2, nA = 60, and nB = nC = 45.
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APPENDIX A
SIMPLIFYING THE MUTUAL INFORMATION FOR A NON-COHERENT NETWORK CODING CHANNEL
Let us consider a non-coherent network coding channel described by the following matrix channel
Y [t] = F [t]X [t], (40)
where X [t] ∈ Fnx×`q , Y [t] ∈ F
ny×`
q , and F [t] ∈ Fny×nxq is an uniformly at random chosen transfer matrix which
is independently chosen for every time-slot t. For simplicity we assume that ` ≥ max[nx, ny].
As stated in [7, Theorem 1], in order to find the capacity of (40) we can instead focus on an equivalent subspace
channel described by a transition probability as follows
PΠY |ΠX (piy |pix) ,


ξ(ny, dim(piy))q
−ny dim(pix) if piy v pix,
0 otherwise.
(41)
In this work we focus on large q regime, so we can approximate the above transition probability as follows
PΠY |ΠX (piy|pix) = 1{dimpix≤ny}1{piy=pix} +
1{dimpix>ny}1{dimpiy=ny}1{piyvpix}[
dimpix
ny
] . (42)
From here on we assume that the input distribution is uniform over all subspaces having the same dimension,
namely
P [ΠX = pix] = αdx
[
`
dx
]−1
, (43)
where dx = dimpix and αdx = P [dimΠX = dx].
Then, for PΠY we can write
PΠY (piy) =
∑
pix
PΠY |ΠX (piy |pix)PΠX (pix)
=
∑
pix:
dimpix≤min[nx,ny ]
1{piy=pix}PΠX (pix) +
∑
pix:
ny<dimpix≤nx
1{dimpiy=ny}1{piyvpix}[
dimpix
ny
] PΠX (pix)
= PΠX (piy)1{dimpiy≤min[nx,ny]} +
nx∑
dx=ny+1
∑
pix:
piyvpix,
dimpix=dx
1{dimpiy=ny}[
dx
ny
] · αdx[
`
dx
]
= PΠX (piy)1{dimpiy≤min[nx,ny]} +
nx∑
dx=ny+1
[
`− ny
dx − ny
]
1{dimpiy=ny}[
dx
ny
] · αdx[
`
dx
] . (44)
Now, we use the following relation (see [7, Lemma 17], [13], and [24]) to further simplify the expression in front
of the summation [
`− ny
dx − ny
][
`
ny
]
=
[
dx
ny
][
`
dx
]
.
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Then for PΠY we have
PΠY (piy) = PΠX (piy)1{dimpiy≤min[nx,ny ]} +
nx∑
dx=ny+1
1{dimpiy=n}αdx
[
`
ny
]−1
= PΠX (piy)1{dimpiy≤min[nx,ny ]} + P [dimΠX > ny]1{dimpiy=ny}
[
`
ny
]−1
= PΠX (piy)1{dimpiy≤min[nx,ny−1]} + P [dimΠX ≥ ny]1{dimpiy=ny}
[
`
ny
]−1
. (45)
Hence, by definition, for the mutual information I(ΠX ; ΠY ) we can write
I(ΠX ; ΠY ) =
nx∑
dx=0
∑
pix:
dimpix=dx
min[ny,dx]∑
dy=0
∑
piy :
dimpiy=dy,
piyvpix
PΠX (pix)PΠY |ΠX (piy|pix) log
PΠY |ΠX (piy |pix)
PΠY (piy)
=
min[nx,ny ]∑
dx=0
∑
pix:
dimpix=dx
dx∑
dy=0
∑
piy:
dimpiy=dy,
piyvpix
αdx[
`
dx
]1{piy=pix} log 1{piy=pix}PΠY (piy)
+ 1{ny<nx}


nx∑
dx=ny+1
∑
pix:
dimpix=dx
ny∑
dy=0
∑
piy :
dimpiy=dy,
piyvpix
αdx[
`
dx
] 1{dx>ny}1{dy=ny}[
dx
ny
] log 1{dx>ny}1{dy=ny}
PΠY (piy)
[
dx
ny
]


= −
min[nx,ny]∑
dx=0
∑
pix:
dimpix=dx
αdx[
`
dx
] logPΠY (pix)
− 1{ny<nx}


nx∑
dx=ny+1
∑
pix:
dimpix=dx
αdx[
`
dx
] log [PΠY (piy)
[
dx
ny
]]
 , (46)
where in the last line piy is an arbitrary subspace with dim piy = ny. So finally we can write
I(ΠX ; ΠY ) = −
min[nx,ny ]∑
dx=0
αdx log
αdx[
`
dx
] − 1{ny<nx}


nx∑
dx=ny+1
αdx log
[[
dx
ny
]
[
`
ny
]P [dimΠX ≥ ny]
]
 . (47)
APPENDIX B
PROOFS
Proof of Corollary 1: First, note that we can write
H(X[0:m]|XE)
(a)
=
m∑
j=0
H(Xi|XE, X[0:j−1])
(b)
= H(X0|XE) +
m∑
j=1
H(Xj |X0), (48)
where (a) follows from the chain rule and (b) follows from the independence of the channels. Similarly, for every
B ( [0 : m] we can expand H(XB|XBc , XE) as follows
H(XB|XBc , XE) = H(X0|XBc , XE) +
∑
j∈B
H(Xj |X0). (49)
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Now, from Theorem 1, we know that for every λ ∈ Λ([0 : m]) there exists a distribution PX0 such that Cs is upper
bounded by
Cs ≤ H(X[0:m]|XE)−
∑
B([0:m]
λBH(XB|XBc , XE)
= H(X0|XE) +
m∑
j=1
H(Xj |X0)−
∑
B([0:m]
λB

H(X0|XBc , XE) +∑
j∈B
H(Xj |X0)


(a)
= H(X0|XE)−
∑
B([0:m], 0∈B
λBH(X0|XBc , XE) +
m∑
j=1
H(Xj |X0)−
m∑
j=1
∑
B([0:m], j∈B
λBH(Xj |X0)
(b)
= H(X0|XE)−
∑
B([0:m], 0∈B
λBH(X0|XBc , XE)
=
∑
B([0:m], 0∈B
λBI(X0;XBc |XE), (50)
where in (a) we have changed the order of summation over j and B, and (b) follows from (10). In order to find
the best upper bound we proceed as follows. For every λ and PX0 we can write
A ,
∑
B([0:m], 0∈B
λBI(X0;XBc |XE)
≥
∑
B([0:m], 0∈B
λB min
j∈Bc
I(X0;Xj|XE)
≥
∑
B([0:m], 0∈B
λB min
j∈[1:m]
I(X0;Xj |XE)
= min
j∈[1:m]
I(X0;Xj |XE). (51)
Let us define i = argminj∈[1:m] I(X0;Xj |XE). Then, note that λB = λBc = 1 where Bc = {i} is a valid choice
according to the condition of Theorem 1, i.e., they satisfy (10). Now, for this choise we have the chain of inequalities
in (51) is satisfied with equalities.
Combining all of the above arguments, for the secrecy upper bound we can write
Cs ≤ max
PX0
min
j∈[1:m]
I(X0;Xj |XE)
≤ min
j∈[1:m]
max
PX0
I(X0;Xj |XE). (52)
Proof of Lemma 5: By using Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we conclude that in order to maximize I(XA;Xi|XE)
with respect to PXA , it is sufficient to maximize I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) for and equivalent subspace channel introduced in
(14). Also Lemma 4 indicates that considering input distributions that are uniform over all subspaces having the
same dimension is sufficient.
Let us assume
P [ΠA = piA] = αd
[
`
d
]−1
, (53)
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where d = dimpiA and αd = P [dimΠA = d]. Now, define
f , I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) = I(ΠA; ΠiΠE)− I(ΠA; ΠE), (54)
and the goal is to maximize f with respect to αis.
We consider two cases as follows.
First case: ni + nE ≤ nA
Then, by applying the results of Appendix A, specially (47), we can write
f = −
ni+nE∑
d=nE+1
αd log
αd[
`
d
] − nA∑
d=ni+nE+1
αd log
[[
d
ni+nE
]
[
`
ni+nE
]P [dimΠA ≥ ni + nE]
]
+
nA∑
d=nE+1
αd log
[[
d
nE
]
[
`
nE
]P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
]
. (55)
Now we have to maximize f with respect to the input distribution, αi. We know that the mutual information
is a concave function with respect to αi’s. This allows us to use the Kuhn-Tucker theorem to solve the convex
optimization problem. According to this theorem, the set of probabilities α∗i , 0 ≤ i ≤ nA, maximize the mutual
information if and only if there exists some constant λ such that

∂f
∂αk
∣∣∣
α
∗
= λ ∀k : α∗k > 0,
∂f
∂αk
∣∣∣
α
∗
≤ λ ∀k : α∗k = 0,
(56)
where 0 ≤ k ≤ nA,
∑nA
i=0 α
∗
i = 1, and α∗ is the vector of the optimum input probabilities of choosing subspaces
of certain dimension,
α
∗ =
[
α∗0 · · · α
∗
nA
]T
. (57)
Taking the derivative for 0 ≤ k < nE we have
∂f
∂αk
= 0, (58)
for k = nE we have
∂f
∂αk
=
nA∑
d=nE+1
αd
[
log e
P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
]
=
P [dimΠA > nE]
P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
log e, (59)
for nE < k < ni + nE we have
∂f
∂αk
= − log
αk[
`
k
] − log e+ log
[[
k
nE
]
[
`
nE
]P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
]
+
P [dimΠA > nE]
P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
log e, (60)
for k = ni + nE we have
∂f
∂αk
= − log
αk[
`
k
] − log e + log
[[
k
nE
]
[
`
nE
]P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
]
+
P [dimΠA > nE]
P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
log e
−
P [dimΠA > ni + nE]
P [dimΠA ≥ ni + nE]
log e, (61)
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and finally for ni + nE < k ≤ nA we have
∂f
∂αk
= + log
[[
k
nE
]
[
`
nE
]P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
]
+
P [dimΠA > nE]
P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
log e
− log
[[
k
ni+nE
]
[
`
ni+nE
]P [dimΠA ≥ ni + nE]
]
−
P [dimΠA > ni + nE]
P [dimΠA ≥ ni + nE]
log e. (62)
We can easily check that for large q, the input distribution that has αni+nE = 1 and αi = 0 for i 6= ni + nE
satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. For this distribution, we have

0 ≤ k < nE :
∂f
∂αk
= 0 < λ,
k = nE :
∂f
∂αk
= log e < λ,
nE < k < ni + nE :
∂f
∂αk
= log
[
k
nE
][
`
nE
]−1
< λ,
k = ni + nE :
∂f
∂αk
= log
[
`
ni+nE
][
ni+nE
nE
][
`
nE
]−1
= λ,
ni + nE < k ≤ nA :
∂f
∂αk
= log e+ log
[
k
nE
][
`
nE
]−1
− log
[
k
ni+nE
][
`
ni+nE
]−1
< λ.
(63)
So we have
max
PΠ
A
I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) = λ
= log
[
`
ni + nE
][
ni + nE
nE
][
`
nE
]−1
= log
[
`− nE
ni
]
≈ ni(` − ni − nE) log q. (64)
Second case: ni + nE > nA
For this case the function f becomes
f = −
nA∑
d=nE+1
αd log
αd[
`
d
] + nA∑
d=nE+1
αd log
[[
d
nE
]
[
`
nE
]P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
]
. (65)
Similar to the previous case, we can apply the Kuhn-Tucker theorem to find the optimal input distribution α∗i ’s.
Taking derivative for 0 ≤ k < nE, we have
∂f
∂αk
= 0, (66)
for k = nE we have
∂f
∂αk
=
nA∑
d=nE+1
αd
[
log e
P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
]
=
P [dimΠA > nE]
P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
log e, (67)
and finally for nE < k ≤ nA we have
∂f
∂αk
= − log
αk[
`
k
] − log e+ log
[[
k
nE
]
[
`
nE
]P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
]
+
P [dimΠA > nE]
P [dimΠA ≥ nE]
log2 e. (68)
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We can easily check that for large q, the input distribution that has αnA = 1 and αi = 0 for i 6= nA satisfies the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions. For this distribution, we have

0 ≤ k < nE :
∂f
∂αk
= 0 < λ,
k = nE :
∂f
∂αk
= log e < λ,
nE < k < nA :
∂f
∂αk
= log
[
k
nE
][
`
nE
]−1
< λ,
k = nA :
∂f
∂αk
= log
[
`
nA
][
nA
nE
][
`
nE
]−1
= λ.
(69)
So for the second case, we have
max
PΠ
A
I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) = λ
= log
[
`
nA
][
nA
nE
][
`
nE
]−1
= log
[
`− nE
nA − nE
]
≈ (nA − nE)(`− nA) log q. (70)
Combining the first and the second case we get the desired result, namely,
max
PΠ
A
I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) = (min[nA, ni + nE]− nE)(`−min[nA, ni + nE]) log q. (71)
Proof of Lemma 6: Let us add UE , ΠE to 2m − 1 subspaces UJ ’s, where ∅ 6= J ⊆ [1 : m]. Then from the
assumption of the lemma, for k ∈ [1 : 2m − 1] and any selection of subsets J1, · · · ,Jk, we have also
θJ1 + · · ·+ θJk ≤ dim (UJ1 + · · ·+ UJk +ΠE)− dim(ΠE)
≤ dim (UJ1 + · · ·+ UJk) . (72)
Now by defining θE , dim(ΠE), we can apply [17, Lemma 4] to the set of subspaces UJ ’s and UE to show that
there exist subspaces U ′J v UJ such that dim(U ′J ) = θJ for ∅ 6= J ⊆ [1 : m], and U ′E = ΠE where all of them
are complementary. Note that in the above argument, we have U ′
E
= ΠE because we set θE = dim(ΠE) (which is
an integer number).
Proof of Lemma 7: Let us assume that Alice has ΠE. Then she can create subspaces U ′J ’s such that by using
Lemma 6, for k ∈ [1 : 2m − 1] and any selection of subsets J1, . . . ,Jk, we have
dim(U ′J1 + · · ·+ U
′
Jk
+ΠE) = θJ1 + · · ·+ θJk + dim(ΠE), (73)
which means that
θJ1 + · · ·+ θJk + dim(ΠE) ≤ nA. (74)
Now, suppose that Alice does not have access to ΠE. From the proof of Lemma 6, we know that for any k and
any subsets J1, . . . ,Jk we have also
θJ1 + · · ·+ θJk ≤ dim (UJ1 + · · ·+ UJk) , (75)
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so by using [17, Lemma 4] Alice can find subspaces U ′J ’s such that they are complementary and dim(U ′J ) = θJ
for every subset J .
From Alice’s point of view ΠE, is chosen independently and uniformly at random from ΠA. So by (74) and
applying Lemma 1, the subspace ΠE is complementary to all U ′J ’s w.h.p and we are done.
Proof of Lemma 8: Construct matrix Y that has as rows the packets y1, . . . , yk. Then note that we can write
 Y
XE

 =

 A
FE

XA =

 A
FE

[ I M ] , (76)
where M is a uniformly random matrix and A ∈ Fk×nAq is the coefficients of Y packets.
We now proceed by expanding H(Y |XE). We have
H(Y |XE) = H(Y,XE)−H(XE)
= H(AM,FEM)−H(FEM)
= [rk (B) − rk (FE)] (`− nA) log q, (77)
where B =

 A
FE

 ∈ FnA×nAq . Now the only way that we have H(Y |XE) = H(Y ) is that B becomes a full rank
matrix.
Now, to prove the assertion of the lemma, we note that creating vectors yi uniformly at random is equivalent to
selecting the elements of matrix A independently and uniformly at random from the field Fq. In this case we can
write
P [B is full-rank] = (q
nA − qnE) · · · (qnA − qnA−1)
qnA(nA−nE)
= 1−O(q−1), (78)
which goes to 1 as q goes to infinity.
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